# 1

Our interpretation is that should means an obligation to resolve something.

Oxford 10(Oxford dictionaries online, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/should, May 22 2010, 6/20/11, OST)

**1** used to indicate obligation, duty**, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone's actions**: he should have been careful **I think we should trust our people more you shouldn't have gone** indicating a desirable or expected state**:** by now pupils should be able to read with a large degree of independence used to give or ask advice or suggestions: **you should go back to bed what should I wear? (I should) used to give advice: I should hold out if I were you.**

**Vio – they don’t imply should**

**Standards**

**a. ground – not having an advocacy means that we’re pinned to the squo killing kritik and counterplan ground.**

**b. limits – they explode limits by making it inpossible to interpret the topic – key intenral to predictability**

**voter for fairness and education**

# 2

**We advocate the entirety of the 1AC without the roll of the ballot claim in the form of establishing a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem.**

**\_\_\_We’re boycotting the role of the ballot. THE JUDGE IS THE BALLOT. In pre-destining the role of this debate round, the Aff removes the judge’s agency and responsibility for their ethical decisions. This turns the case.**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne Kappeler, Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Al-Akhawayn University – “The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior – pp. 10-11 – 1995)

**‘We are the war’ does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society**–which would be an equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of ‘collective irresponsibility’, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibly becomes the equivalent of universal acquittal. ON the contrary, the object is precisely to analyze the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on a stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility—leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so called political disillusionment. Single citizens—even more so than those of other nations—have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hecergovina or Somalia—since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those are not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of “what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense? Since we seem to regard the metaspheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN—finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’ ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our ‘non-comprehension’: our willed **ref**usal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our own ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow dorm of refugees and I don’t’ –our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refuges, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape our ‘feelings, our relationships, our values,’ according to the structures and values of war and violence. So if we more beyond the usual frame of violence, towards structures of thought and employed with decisions to act, this also means making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely be perceived any longer. There is talk of the government doing ‘nothing’, of its ‘inaction’, of the need for action, the time for action, the need for strategies, our inability to act as well as our desire to become ‘active’ again. We seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which, like the cosmic black hole, tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size. Hence, this is also an attempt to shift the focus against to the fact that we are continuously acting and doing, and that there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing. Rather, the binary opposition of ‘action’ and ‘no action’ seems to serve the simple evaluation of the good and bad. We speak of being ‘active’ or wanting to be active again, where being active in its simple vacuity is ‘good’, ‘doing nothing’ is rather bad, and where the quality of the action seems secondary to the fact of action as such**.**

**\_\_\_That’s the root cause of their impacts.**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne Kappeler, Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Al-Akhawayn University – “The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior – pp. 10-11 – 1995)

Political action, in this view, is not something which will take place only in a more propitious future when circumstances have changed so much, or a revolution is already so far under way that it can take its course, and we as the 'politically active' people can join it. Nor can political action mean something we engage in only on condition that there will be enough others, or better, masses of them, who think as I ' do, and I do what I want to do. ' **Political action does not necessarily.**  **Imply mass actions whose massiveness will guarantee their**  **success**. For such individual conceptions of political mass action reflect the power thinking of generals commanding the troops of the 'masses' to suit their own strategies. Nor does it help to wish for the masses voluntarily to think as I do and to want what I want - that they be like-minded (like me), thus helping to fulfill my dream of a mass action. Even this has happened in the history of generals. My dream remains the dream of a commander who' has like-minded masses of volunteer troops at his disposal. instead, we could consider that even **our thinking is an opportunity**  **for action**, that it can be determined in this way or that, **that it is the**  **first opportunity, the first political situation, in which to exercise**  **political choice**. 'We make the war possible, we allow it to happen', says Drakulic , 'We only have one weak protection against it, our consciousness. There are no them and us, there are no grand categories, abstract numbers, black-and-white truths, simple facts. **There**  **is only us** - **and**, yes, **we are responsible for each other,.** ,11 And if we find this too minimal to satisfy cur aspirations for political action and change, why don't we do it anyway, for a start?) So I begin from the assumption that **all of** LlS, **regardless of** our relative **positions within the social power structure, do permanently have to**  **decide how we are going to act in a given situation.** We have described in some considerable detail the many limitations on our freedom of action - it is the first thing (and often the only one) that occurs to us in justifying our actions. But **each situation**, save that of the absolute and ultimate violence' of our destruction, **leaves scope for**  **action**, however **minimal, which permits the decision to consent to**  **violence or to resist.** The question remains how we use the opportunities for action we have, and how we deal with the relative advantages which offer themselves. Here we face the decision to (ab )use our power in our own interests and to our own advantage, or not to; here we face the choice to do violence to others, or not to. It is a most political question, and a most political decision.

# 3

**\_\_\_We start by offering a myth of a nonhuman being: the wood tick.**

**Bell & Russell 00** (Anne C. Bell, Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University & Constance L. Russell, Associate Professor at Lakehead University – Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn – Canadian Journal of Education 25, 3 (2000) 188-203)

**An** equally **illuminating insect story, intended to evoke**, once again, **the subjective world of a nonhuman being, is found in** **Evernden’s The Natural Alien** (1985, pp. 79–80). **Borrowing from the work of biologist Jakob von Uexkull,** Evernden invites readers “to **imagine that we are walking through a meadow and that we discern ‘a soap bubble around each creature to represent its own world, filled with the perceptions which it alone knows’** ” (p. 79). **He then attempts to describe what might be the world of a wood tick. The wood tick**, he explains, **is literally and figuratively blind to the world as we know it. What we readily perceive about our environment would be unknown, unknowable, and irrelevant to her. Her world is composed of three elements: light, sweat, and heat. These are all that she needs to complete her life cycle. Light will lead her to the top of a bush, where she will cling (for as long as 18 years!) until the smell of sweat alerts her to a passing animal. She will then drop, and if she lands on a warm animal, she will indulge in a blood meal, fall to the ground, lay her eggs, and die.** Like Abram, **Evernden** (1985) **challenges commonplace, mechanistic assumptions that reduce other life forms to programmed automatons and intimates instead a meaningful life-world completely unlike and outside our own: To speak of reflexes and instincts is to obscure the essential point that the tick’s world is a world, every bit as valid and adequate as our own. There is a subject, and like all subjects it has its world . . . The tick is able to occupy a world that is perceptually meaningful to it. Out of the thousands or millions of kinds of information that might be had, the tick sees only what is of significance to it. The world is tailored to the animal; they are entirely complementary . . . This is quite a different view of existence from our usual one in which the animal is simply an exploiter of certain natural resources. We are not talking just about observable interactions between subjects and objects but rather about a very complete interrelation of self and world, so complete that the world could serve as a definition of the self. Without the tick there is no tick-world, no tick-space, no tick-time, – no tick-reality.** (pp. 80–81) **Evernden’s remarks are significant for the possibilities they open up in our understanding both of the nonhuman and of ourselves. On one hand, they contest the limited notion that awareness is a specifically human attribute. On the other, they remind us that we humans too have bodies that respond to light, sweat, and heat; we too know the world through our bodies in a way that is not entirely dependent upon language; and this bodily knowledge plays an important role in defining our world and giving meaning to it.**

**\_\_\_We acknowledge their criticism of contemporary ecological theory. For most of its existence, poststructuralism has ignored the anthropocentrism that is inherent in many schlolars, including those who challenge racism, patriarchy and homophobia. However, we believe that a critical pedagogy, which takes into account all forms of domination, including other-than-human domination, is the best way to attack the root cause of the harms identified in their Affirmative.**

**Bell & Russell 00** (Anne C. Bell, Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University & Constance L. Russell, Associate Professor at Lakehead University – Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn – Canadian Journal of Education 25, 3 (2000) 188-203)

For the largest part of our species’ existence, humans have negotiated relationships with every aspect of the sensuous surroundings, exchanging possibilities with every flapping form, with each textured surface and shivering entity that we happened to focus upon. All could speak, articulating in gesture and whistle and sigh a shifting web of meanings that we felt on our skin or inhaled through our nostrils or focused with our listening ears, and to which we replied . . . (Abram, 1996, p. ix) . . . it is language in the form of conflicting discourses which constitutes us as conscious thinking subjects and enables us to give meaning to the world and to act to transform it. (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000): 188 –203 **Poststructuralist theories have provided a discursive framework through which to critique and contest many of the key tenets of humanism. In drawing attention to the cultural and historical specificity of all human knowledge, they have been used to disrupt assumptions about objectivity, the unified subject, and the universality of human experience, and thereby to expose the classist, racist, sexist, and heterosexist underpinnings of Western humanist thought. For this reason poststructuralism offers promising theoretical perspectives for educators who wish to challenge cultural representations and structures that give rise to inequities.** Although we acknowledge the important contribution of poststructuralism to analyses of oppression, privilege, and power in education, we believe that **educators must continue to probe its limitations and implications.** Accordingly, we consider here how **poststructuralism**, as it is taken up within critical pedagogy, **tends to reinforce rather than subvert deepseated humanist assumptions about humans and nature by taking for granted the “borders”** (as in Giroux, 1991) **that define nature as the devalued Other. We ask what meanings and voices have been pre-empted by the virtually exclusive focus on humans and human language in a human-centred epistemological framework. At the same time, we discuss how relationships between language, communication, and meaningful experience are being conceptualized** outside the field of critical pedagogy (in some cases from a poststructuralist perspective) **to call into question these very assumptions.** Although we concentrate primarily on societal narratives that shape understandings of human and nature, we also touch on two related issues of language: the “forgetting” of nonverbal, somatic experience and the misplaced presumption of human superiority based on linguistic capabilities. In so doing, our intention is to deal constructively with some of the anthropocentric blind spots within critical pedagogy generally and within poststructuralist approaches to critical pedagogy in particular. We hope to illuminate places where these streams of thought and practice move in directions compatible with our own aspirations as educators. To borrow from poststructuralism and yet remain within a critical pedagogy framework gives rise, of course, to inevitable tensions. Critical pedagogy continues earlier traditions such as “progressive,” “radical,” “emancipatory,” and “liberation” pedagogies whose root metaphors are distinctly modern (see Bowers, 1993a, pp. 25–26.). Poststructuralism, however, brings into play postmodern perspectives and methods of analysis that challenge modernist notions of, for example, freedom, history and progress, rationality, and subjectivity. Nevertheless, poststructuralism has influenced critical theories of education for over a decade, generating fruitful discussions about epistemic certainty, master narratives, stable signifiers, and essentialized identities. As environmental educators, we have found poststructuralism, in concert with the many other theoretical perspectives informing critical pedagogy (e.g., feminism, Marxism, antiracism, Freudian theory, popular education), to be useful in our efforts to come to terms with dominant assumptions about education. We recognize, furthermore, that poststructuralism as it is taken up within critical pedagogy is only one manifestation of poststructuralist approaches in the human sciences. The term poststructuralist applies to a range of (not necessarily coherent) theoretical perspectives. The fact that the term is used differently in Australia, the United States, and Canada further complicates matters (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 359). Despite important differences, however, forms of poststructuralism share certain assumptions about language, meaning, and subjectivity. A common factor is the analysis of language as “the place where social and political consequences are defined and contested” (Weedon, 1987, pp. 20–21). GROUNDS FOR CONSIDERATION **We come to critical pedagogy with a background in environmental thought and education. Of primary concern and interest to us are relationships among humans and the “more-than-human world”** (Abram, 1996), **the ways in which those relationships are constituted and prescribed in modern industrial society, and the implications and consequences of those constructs.** As a number of scholars and nature advocates have argued, **the many manifestations of the current environmental crisis** (e.g., species extinction, toxic contamination, ozone depletion, topsoil depletion, climate change, acid rain, deforestation) **reflect predominant Western concepts of nature, nature cast as mindless matter, a mere resource to be exploited for human gain** (Berman, 1981; Evernden, 1985; Merchant, 1980). **An ability to respond adequately to the situation therefore rests**, at least in part, **on a willingness to critique prevailing discourses about nature and to consider alternative representations** (Cronon, 1996; Evernden, 1992; Hayles, 1995). To this end, **poststructuralist analysis has been and will continue to be invaluable.** It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that **disrupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human domination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environmental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing** (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, **if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature** (Carlson, 1995). For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, **the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant.** Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), **nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms.** Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). **To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power** (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). **What would it mean**, then, **for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”?** This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. **The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it.** Following feminist analyses, we find that **examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences”** (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). **This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities** (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned. **Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy**, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.1

**\_\_\_In contrast to their methodology of eco-pragmatism, we offer a competing methodology: that of critical pedagogy informed by post-structualism. We believe that our method, which uses narratives, like the wood tick, along with situating education within particular local contexts, is a better way to break down anthropocentrism.**

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SHARED CONVERSATIONS **In challenging anthropocentrism, the two of us find cause for hope in the fact that our critique can be seen as compatible with the work of many proponents of critical pedagogy. Specifically, attention to local contexts, lived relationships, and embodied learning within critical pedagogy matches similar considerations within environmental thought and education. The poststructuralist emphasis on societal narratives and language practices, already well developed in critical pedagogy, is likewise being taken up by environmental scholars and educators. What strikes us as most auspicious**, then, **is the potential for shared conversations, with insights from one field sparking unasked questions and opening up unexplored pathways for another.** For instance, carrying forward the concerns and convictions of Dewey (1938/1963) and the progressive education movement, **theorists of critical pedagogy have written extensively about the disjuncture between the kinds of environments and interactions necessary for active and transformative learning and the social relations we enter into through academic training** (e.g., McKenna, 1991). **They recommend practices situated in students’ cultures** (e.g., Shor, 1992, p. 44) **and in the particular communities, schools, and other social groups of which students are a part** (e.g., Walsh, 1991, p. 99). **In so doing, they stress the importance of relationships, contexts, and local histories in defining who we are, calling into question the individualistic and universalistic narratives that shape curriculum and schooling generally** (e.g., Giroux, 1991, p. 24; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). **So far**, however, **such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environmental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis.** For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our inability to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environmental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such notions as “empowerment.” Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan. A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights. Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environmental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993). N. **Gough** (1999) **explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human transactions with the phenomenal world”** (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). **Narrative strategies**, he asserts, **should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding”** (N. Gough, 1993, p. 621). We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the work of science and environmental educators. **The societal narratives that legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism**, and so on, **merit everyone’s concern. And since the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vulnerable** (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), **proponents of critical pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the human-centred frameworks that structure their endeavours. No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard. Nevertheless, anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and agency will need to be revisited.** In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks. Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of humanists to pause for a moment at least.

# Case

**The Affirmative reduces the Mexican recipients of their assistance program to bare life. Our link operates on two levels: first, the actual giving of assistance creates an asymmetrical relationship between the United States and Mexico; second, their rhetoric and representations force Mexico into performing rituals of gratefulness.**

**Korf 05** (Benedikt Korf, Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Liverpool – “Antinomies of Generosity: Moral geographies and post-tsunami aid in Southeast Asia” - http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/events/conferences/documents/Korf.pdf - 2005)

I would argue that these **practices in the aid chain have had humiliating effects for local agents. The exclusion of affected people from planning the reconstruction process and the performances of posturing have undermined their self-esteem, reducing them to pure passivity.** Eye on Aceh (2006) reports about how recipients of aid felt forced into passivity. **They are only invited to become active when they have to return the gift in performing the rituals of gratefulness. Here, we can see the "poison" of generous gifts as a symbolic expression of domination.** In the micro-politics of aid giving, this is symbolised in the rituals of giving aid in ceremonies of "handing over" relief items to "victims". It is here that the humiliation happens – **it is not the tsunami that made these persons "victims", it is during the rituals of giving and of brokering aid in a one-directional way that they become victimised. By degrading those people affected by the tsunami to bare victims, we derail them from their political rights of (equal) compatriots, of fellow human beings. What we see and reproduce is a kind of "bare life"** (Agamben 1998) **– the "pure" victims of nature's force. In a sense, this is the new homo sacer of** Giorgio **Agamben – the bare victim placed outside of the polity.** Slavoj **Žižek captures this paradox when he asserts that one is deprived of human rights when one is reduced to a "bare" human being** (2005, 43) – or a bare victim – **without citizenship rights, profession or identity other than this fuzzy victimhood. Victims become homo sacer, bare victims, just in the process of handing over, of reducing those persons to recipients (and nothing beyond).** This ambivalence explicates the antinomies of generosity: **Of course, private donors in the West did not intentionally want to create frustration among “recipients” or “beneficiaries” or humiliate them. However, the expectation of return created through the practices that made Western generosity a kind of consumption good has forced aid brokers into practices and performances that had to reproduce the donor-recipient asymmetry and that had to demonstrate the agency of foreign interventions as superior to local agency. While it seemed to be relatively easy to cash into the Western affections after the disaster, it was more difficult to translate such compassion, benevolence and generosity towards the suffering other into a constructive relationship of aiding. Donating** - practising generosity as a global symbolic act of solidarity - **appears to be manageable, but practising aid as an encounter is more difficult because it involves the activation of a relationship between self and other, between donor and recipient, a relationship that is mediated through aid brokers. The core problem with geographies of generosity is**, I would argue, **that they invigorate compassion and emotions as the core virtues that should ground ethical action. However, compassion is not per se something that is positive for the one who is the addressee of this compassion. Compassion creates asymmetric relations: it is born from a feeling of superiority** (I feel relieved that I am not this other who suffers). **Compassion is also asymmetric, because the giving self feels compassionate, is active, while the receiving other is pitied and thus passive. This asymmetry creates the antinomies between donor and beneficiary** – as exposed in the gift relations of the aid chain.

**\_\_\_Impact: The K turns the case. Our conception of biopolitics explains their ideas of anthropocentrism. The notion of an anthropocentric dualism is only possible because of the political distinctions made by humans themselves.**

**Oliver 07** (Kelly, Professor at Vanderbilt University – “Stopping the Antrhopoligical Machine: Agamben with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty” – PhaenEx2, no. 2, Fall/Winter 2007 - amr.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/phaenex/article/download/236/396 – 2007)

To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will therefore mean … to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the suspension of suspension, Shabbat of both animal and man. (Agamben, The Open 92) In The Open, Giorgio **Agamben diagnoses the history of both science and philosophy as part of** what he calls **the “anthropological machine” through which the human is created with and against the animal.** On his analysis, early forms of this “machine” operated by humanizing animals such that some ‘people’ were considered animals in human form, for example barbarians and slaves. **Modern versions of the machine operate by animalizing humans such that some ‘people’** were/**are considered less than human**, for example Jews during the Holocaust and more recently perhaps Iraqi detainees. **Agamben describes both sides of the anthropological machine: If, in the machine of the moderns, the outside is produced through the exclusion of an inside and the inhuman produced by animalizing the human, here [the machine of earlier times] the inside is obtained through the inclusion of an outside, and the non-man is produced by the humanization of an animal**: the man-ape, the enfant sauvage or Homo ferus, but also and above all the slave, the barbarian, and the foreigner, as figures of an animal in human form. (37) **The human-animal divide**, then, **is not only political but also sets up the very possibility of politics. Who is included in human society and who is not is a consequence of the politics of “humanity,” which engenders the polis itself. In this regard, politics itself is the product of the anthropological machine, which is inherently lethal to some forms of** (human) **life.** Although **Agamben’s analysis could be extended to include a diagnosis of the dangers to animal life**, in The Open, he is primarily concerned with the dangers to human life.1 **Agamben argues that the dichotomy between man and animal is a division within the category of the human itself. In both the earlier and the modern versions, humanity is divided into more and less human types, which in turn becomes justification for slavery and genocide. The question, then, for Agamben is not one of human rights, but rather how the category of the “human” is produced and maintained against the category of the animal, which functions as both constitutive outside and inside such that some “people” are rendered non- or sub-human.**

The aff’s technocratic attempt to manage the environment sells nature out to power-knowledge regimes seeking to manage the health and longevity of the population. Environmentalizing biopolitics risks extinction.

Timothy W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,1999, Discourses of the Environment, p. 142-44

The ideas advanced by various exponents of sustainable devel­opment discourse are intriguing. And, perhaps if they were implemented in the spirit that their originators intended, the eco­logical situation of the Earth might improve. Yet, even after two decades of heeding the theory and practice of such eco-knowledge, sustainable development mostly has not happened, and it most likely will not happen, even though its advocates continue to be celebrated as visionaries. Encircled by grids of ecological alarm, sustainability discourse tells us that today’s allegedly unsustainable environments need to be disassembled, recombined and subjected to the disciplinary designs of expert management. Enveloped in such enviro-disciplinary frames, any environment could be redirected to fulfil the ends of other economic scripts, managerial directives and administrative writs denominated in sustainability values. Sustainability, then, engenders its own forms of ‘environmentality’, which would embed alternative instrumental rationalities beyond those of pure market calculation in the policing of ecological spaces. Initially, one can argue that the modern regime of bio-power formation described by Foucault was not especially attentive to the role of nature in the equations of biopolitics (Foucault 1976: 138—42). The controlled tactic of inserting human bodies into the machineries of industrial and agricultural production as part and parcel of strategically adjusting the growth of human popula­tions to the development of industrial capitalism, however, did generate systems of bio-power. Under such regimes, power/know­ledge systems bring ‘life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations’, making the manifold disciplines of knowledge and discourses of power into new sorts of productive agency as part of the ‘transformation of human life’ (ibid. 145). Once this threshold was crossed, social experts began to recognize how the environmental interactions of human economics, politics and technologies continually put all human beings’ existence as living beings in question. Foucault divides the environmental realm into two separate but interpenetrating spheres of action: the biological and the histor­ical. For most of human history, the biological dimension, or forces of nature acting through disease and famine, dominated human existence, with the ever present menace of death. Developments in agricultural technologies, as well as hygiene and health techniques, however, gradually provided some relief from starvation and plague by the end of the eighteenth century. As a result, the historical dimension began to grow in importance, as ‘the development of the different fields of knowledge concerned with life in general, the improvement of agricultural techniques, and the observations and measures relative to man’s life and survival contributed to this relaxation: a relative control over life averted some of the imminent risks of death’ (ibid. 142). The historical then began to envelop, circumscribe or surround the biological, creating inter­locking disciplinary expanses for ‘the environmental’. And these environmentalized settings quickly came to dominate all forms of concrete human reality: ‘in the space of movement thus conquered, and broadening and organising that space, methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and under­took to control and modify them’ (ibid.). While Foucault does not explicitly define these spaces, methods and knowledges as ‘envir­onmental’, these enviro-disciplinary manoeuvres are the origin of many aspects of environmentalization. As biological life is refracted through economic, political and technological existence, ‘the facts of life’ pass into fields of control for any discipline of eco-knowledge and spheres of intervention for the management of geo-power. Foucault recognized how these shifts implicitly raised ‘ecolo­gical issues’ to the extent that they disrupted and redistributed the understandings provided by the classical episteme for defining human interactions with nature. Living became environmentalized as humans, or ‘a specific living being, and specifically related to other living beings’ (ibid. 143), began to articulate their historical and biological life in profoundly new ways from within artificial cities and mechanical modes of production. Environmentalization arose from ‘this dual position of life that placed it at the same time outside history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by the latter’s techniques of know­ledge and power’ (ibid.). Strangely, even as he makes this linkage, Foucault does not develop these ecological insights, suggesting that ‘there is no need to lay further stress on the proliferation of political technologies that ensued, investing the body, health, modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, the whole space of existence’ (ibid. 143—4). Even so, Foucault here found the conjunction needed for ‘the environment’ to emerge as an eco-knowledge formation and/or a cluster of eco-power tactics for an enviro-discipline. As human beings begin consciously to wager their life as a species on the products of their biopolitical strategies and technological systems, a few recognize that they are also wagering the lives of other, or all, species as well. While Foucault regards this shift as just one of many lacunae in his analysis, everything changes as human bio-power systems interweave their operations in the biological environment, penetrating the workings of many ecosystems with the techniques of knowledge and power. Once human power/know­ledge formations become the foundation of industrial society’s economic development, they also become a major factor in all terrestrial life-forms’ continued physical survival. Eco-knowledge about geo-power thus becomes through enviro-disciplines a stra­tegic technology that reinvests human bodies — their means of health, modes of subsistence, and styles of habitation integrating the whole space of existence — with bio-historical significance. It then reframes them within their bio-physical environments, which are now also filled with various animal and plant bodies posi­tioned in geo-physical settings, as essential elements in managing the health of any human ecosystem’s carrying capacity.

**\_\_\_The Aff double-turns itself – any anti-anthropocentric ethic necessary re-inscribes the philosophy that created the divide in the first place.**

**Watson 83** (Richard A. Watson, Professor at Washington University in St. Louis – “A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism” – Environmental Ethics, vol. 5, no. 3 – 1983)

**Human beings** do alter things. They **cause the extinction of many species, and they change the Earth's ecology.** This is what humans do. This is their destiny. If they destroy many other species and themselves in the process, they do no more than has been done by many another species. The human species should be allowed-if any species can be said to have a right-to live out its evolutionary potential, to its own destruction if that is the end result. It is nature's way. **This is not a popular view. But most alternative anti-anthropocentric** biocentric **arguments for preserving nature are self-contradictory. The only way man will survive is if he uses his brains to save himself. One reason why we should curb human behavior that is destructive of other species and the environment is because in the end it is destructive of the human species as well.** I hope it is human nature to survive because we are smart. **But those who appeal for a new ethic** or religion or ecosophy **based on an intuitive belief that they know what is right not only for other people, but also for the planet as a whole, exhibit the hubris that they themselves say got us in such a mess in the first place. If the ecosphere is so complicated that we may never understand its workings, how is it that so many** ecosophers **are so sure that they know what is right for us to do now?** Beyond the issue of man's right to do whatever he can according to the power-makes-right ecosophic ethic outlined by Naess, we may simply be wrong about what is “good” for the planet. **Large numbers of species have been wiped out before**, e.g., **at the time the dinosaurs became extinct. Perhaps wiping out and renewal is just the way things go.**

#### Giroux’s method fails – never specifies the alternative.

Franks, Lecturer in Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, 7

[Benjamin, 2007, Variant issue 29, “Who Are You to tell me to Question Authority?”, http://www.variant.org.uk/29texts/Franks29.html]

Potentially stronger criticisms of Giroux’s text lie precisely in his underlying hypothesis concerning the totalising power of neo-conservatism. Giroux shares with the members of the Frankfurt School, who he approvingly cites, a pessimistic and almost wholly determined account of future social developments, in which the prognosis for alternatives to dominant powers looks bleak. Giroux, like Adorno and Marcuse, fears that we are approaching a one-dimensional future composed of intellectually stunted individuals, who are manipulated by the cultural industries, endorse militarised social hierarchies and engage in relationships conceived of only in terms of market-values. This grim dystopia is subject to continual monitoring by an evermore technologically-equipped police and legitimised by an increasingly subservient, partisan and trivial media. However, whilst Giroux’s account of growing authoritarianism is convincingly expressed, it is potentially disempowering, as it would suggest little space for opposition. It is not simply wishful thinking to suggest that the existing power structures are neither as complete nor as impervious as Giroux’s account would suggest. Whilst the old media of radio, film and television are increasingly dominated by a few giant corporations (p.46), new technologies have opened access to dissident voices and created new forms of communication and organisation. Whilst the military are extending their reach into greater areas of social and political life, and intervening in greater force throughout the globe, resistance to military discipline is also arising, with fewer willing to join the army in both the US and UK.7 Bush’s long term military objectives look increasingly unfeasible as Peter Schoomaker, the former US Chief of Staff, told Congress on December 15, 2006 that even the existing deployment policy is looking increasingly ‘untenable’.8 The ‘overstretch’ of military resources is matched by an economy incapable of fulfilling its primary neo-conservative goals of low taxation, sound national finances and extensive military interventions. Whilst this is not to suggest that the US is on the point of financial implosion, the transition to a fully proto-fascist state is unlikely to be seamless or certain. Giroux’s preferred form of resistance is radical education. The photographs from Abu Ghraib were iconic not just in their encapsulation of proto-fascism, but in their public pedagogic role. Their prominence highlighted the many different sites of interpretation, as Giroux rightly stresses, there is no single way to interpret a photograph, however potent the depiction. The ability to interpret an image requires an ongoing process by a critical citizenry capable of identifying the methods by which a picture’s meanings are constructed (p. 135). Giroux’s critical pedagogy overtly borrows from Adorno’s essay ‘Education After Auschwitz’, and proposes “modes of education that produce critical, engaging and free minds” (p. 141). But herein lies one of the flaws with the text: Giroux never spells out what sorts of existing institutions and social practices are practical models of this critical pedagogy. Thus, he does not indicate what methods he finds appropriate in resisting the proto-fascist onslaught nor how merely interpreting images critically would fundamentally contest hierarchical power-relationships. Questions arise as to the adequacy of his response to the totalising threat he identifies in the main section of the book. Clearly existing academic institutions in the US are barely adequate given the campaigns against dissident academics led by David Horowitz (p.143). Giroux recounts in the final chapter, an interview conducted by Sina Rahmani, his own flight from the prestigious Penn State University to McMaster University in Canada because of managerial harassment following his public criticisms of Penn’s involvement in military research (p. 186). But whilst Giroux recognises that education is far wider than what takes place in institutions of learning there is no account of what practical forms these take. Nor does Giroux give an account of why a critical pedagogy would take priority over informed aesthetic or ethical practices. Such a concentration on education would appear to prioritise those who already have (by virtue of luck or social circumstance) an already existing expertise in critical thinking, risking an oppressive power-relationship in which the expert drills the student into rigorous assessment. This lapse into the role of the strident instructor demanding the correct form of radical response, occasionally appears in Giroux’s text: “within the boundaries of critical education, students have to learn the skills and knowledge to narrate their own stories [and] resist the fragmentation and seductions of market ideologies” (p. 155). Woe betide the student who prefers to narrate the story of the person sitting next to them, or fails to measure up to the ‘educators’ standard of critical evaluation

#### their giroux-corroborated vision of academic political agency is doomed to inevitable frustration producing serial epistemic failures – every instance of a link is a reason to cast annihilatory doubt on their solvency claims – by logical necessity, their academic knowledge production is utterly inconsequential given that the 1ac is an empty repetition of the spectre of political agency.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

Similarly, Henry Giroux concludes¶ his argument about the “responsibility of intellectuals” with the¶ declaration that “if we do not want to repeat the present as the future, or10¶ even worse, become complicit in the dominant exercise of power, it is time¶ for educators to mobilize collectively their energies by breaking down the¶ illusion of unanimity that dominant power propagates while working diligently,¶ tirelessly, and collectively to reclaim the promises of a truly global,¶ democratic future” (2004, 77).¶ Giroux’s concluding words, in which scholars reclaim the promises of a¶ truly global democratic future, echo Ono and Sloop’s construction of scholarship¶ as the politically embedded pursuit of utopia, McKerrow’s academic¶ emancipation of the oppressed, McGee’s social surgery, Hartnett’s social¶ justice scholar, and Fuller’s agent of justice. Each aims to unify the competing¶ elements within the scholarly subject position—scholarly reflection¶ and political agency—by reducing the former to the latter. Žižek’s advice¶ is to consider how such attempts are always doomed to frustration, not¶ because ideals are hard to live up to but because of the impossibility of¶ resolving the antagonism central to the scholarly subject position. The titles¶ “public intellectual” and “critical rhetorician” attest to the fundamental tension.¶ “Public” and “rhetorician” both represent the aspiration to political¶ engagement, while “critical” and “intellectual” set the scholar apart from¶ noncritical, nonintellectual public rhetoric. However, rather than allowing¶ the contingently articulated terms to exist in a state of paradoxical tension,¶ these authors imagine an organic, unavoidable, necessary unity. The scholar¶ is, in one moment, wholly public and wholly intellectual, wholly critical and¶ wholly rhetorical, wholly scholar and wholly citizen—an impossible unity,¶ characteristic of the sublime, in which the antagonism vanishes (2005, 147).¶ Yet, as Žižek predicts, the sublime is the impossible. The frustration-producing¶ gap between the unity of the ideological sublime and conflicted¶ experience quickly begins to put pressure on the ideology. This is born out¶ in the shift from the exhilarated tone accompanying the birth of critical¶ rhetoric (and its liberation of rhetoric scholarship from the incoherent¶ and untenable demands of scientific objectivity) to a dispirited accounting¶ for the difficulty of actually embodying the imagined unity of scholarly¶ reflection and political agency. Simonson, for example, draws attention¶ to the gap, noting how, twenty years later, it is hard to resist the feeling¶ that “the bulk of our academic publishing is utterly inconsequential.” His¶ hope is that a true connection between scholarly reflection and political¶ agency may be possible outside of academia (2010, 95). Fuller approaches¶ this conclusion when he says that the preferred path to filling universities¶ with agents of justice is through “scaling back the qualifications needed for¶ tenure-stream posts from the doctorate to the master’s degree,” a way of¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 11¶ addressing the antagonism that amounts to setting half of it afloat (2006,¶ 154). Hartnett is especially interesting because while he also insists on the¶ existence of the gap, dismissing “many” of his “colleagues” as merely dispensing¶ “politically vacuous truisms” or, worse, as serving as “tools of the¶ state” and “humanities-based journals” as “impenetrably dense” and filled¶ with “jargon-riddled nonsense,” he evinces a considerable impatience with¶ the audiences he must engage as a social justice scholar (2010, 69, 74–75). In¶ addition to reducing those populating the mass media to a cabal of “rotten¶ corporate hucksters,” Hartnett rejects vernacular criticisms of his activism¶ as “ranting and raving by fools,” and chafes at becoming “a target for yahoos¶ of all stripes” (87, 84). In other words, the gap is not only recognized on¶ the academic side of the ledger but appears on the public side as well; the¶ public (in the vernacular sense of the word) does not yield to the desire¶ of the social justice scholar. Or, as Žižek puts it, referencing Lacan, “You¶ never look at me from the place in which I see you” (1991, 126). More telling¶ still, Hartnett’s main examples of social justice scholars are either retired or¶ located outside of academia (2010, 86). As Simonson suggests, and Hartnett¶ implicitly concedes, it may well be that it really is only outside the academy¶ that there can be immediate, material, political consequences.¶ In light of Žižek’s account of antagonism, one should not be surprised,¶ however, by the conclusion that broadly effective activism is only possible¶ outside of academia. The failure to unify scholarship and politics was predestined¶ in the symbolic imagination that rendered them unified. Instead,¶ effectively coming to terms with an antagonism means finding ways to¶ keep the competing elements of the antagonism in view—and not simply¶ as “bad” academic pretensions in conflict with “good” political motives.¶ Rather, the two elements that constitute the scholarly subject position,¶ reflective investigation and the production of unavoidable consequences,¶ must be constantly present, each vying for our attention. And, insofar as¶ the two elements are not kept in tension with each other, the scholarly subject¶ position becomes increasingly unbearable, leading to the production of¶ what Žižek calls supplemental ideological fantasies or ready explanations¶ for the gap.¶ For Fuller, the gap between lived experience and the wished-for¶ embodiment of the scholar as agent of justice is explained not by the basic¶ impossibility of resolving the antagonism within the realm of the symbolic¶ itself but by the treacherous acts of colleagues of low moral character.¶ Deploying a Puritan rhetoric (Roberts-Miller 1999), Fuller blames the¶ selfishness¶ of individual scholars pursuing personal gain and “convenience ¶ 12¶ for the failure of activist scholarship to emerge (2006, 150). Other scholars¶ who fail to be agents of justice are “feckless” (2006, 149). Those resistant to¶ such a scholarly identity “simply follow the path of least intellectual resistance,”¶ preferring “easily funded research” because it offers “greater professional¶ recognition” (2006, 110, 111). Hartnett follows Fuller in explaining¶ how “theory wolves” have “learned to play the tenure game for their own¶ benefit.” Current “¶ graduate students and assistant professors” are cynical,¶ self-obsessed, and content to explore “the intricacies of representation,¶ often with psychoanalytic overtones that explicitly focus on the self or¶ psyche rather than the community or the political” (2006, 72–73).¶ Yet, fantasy, according to Žižek, is not simple delusion. In fact, how¶ much scholarly research is unrelated to the exorcism of personal demons?¶ Who among us has not shaded an argument one way or another in order to¶ please a particular audience? Who has not fecklessly decided against even¶ sending a letter to the local newspaper? Rather, a key characteristic of fantasy,¶ in Žižek’s use of Lacan, is that it accounts for a persistent failure in a¶ prevailing ideology without making reference to basic, structuring antagonisms¶ inherent to every use of symbols. In this case, the gap—the existence¶ of academic work that appears not to serve (or in reality does not serve) a¶ sublime vision of an organic unity between scholarship and citizenship—is¶ accounted for by the existence of cynical, crafty scholars of low academic¶ rank who just want to get ahead. This fantastic pathway to the palliation of¶ the identity-jeopardizing symptom suggests that without these cowardly,¶ selfish, yet strangely powerful neophytes, scholarly reflection and political¶ agency would finally consummate their symbolic union. In this new context¶ of frustration, what is now most “real” is the spiritual principle of the¶ oneness¶ of scholarly reflection and political agency, while the experienced¶ fact of failed transcendence is reduced to a mere empirical obstacle (feckless¶ or selfish individuals) to be displaced.¶ What is Žižek’s psychoanalytic advice? Identify with the symptom¶ (1989, 128). Identification with the symptom means noting how the symptom¶ is quite likely a byproduct of the ideology itself, or a consequence of¶ one’s own symbolic identity, and not a simple empirical fact to be negated.¶ In this case, the antagonism between the symbolic practices of scholarly¶ reflection and political action yields academic products that cannot be¶ reduced to disinterested science or political engagement. To be an academic¶ is to be (unsettlingly) in the political world but not of the political world. It¶ is to resist the belief that one could finally fulfill the drive to transcendence¶ structuring the academic subject position. Žižek’s “coming to terms” with¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 13¶ antagonism means, in Burke’s language, learning to leave the two impulses¶ constituting this dialectical pair in “jangling relation” to each other (Žižek¶ 1989, 3, 5, 133; 2005, 242–43; Burke 1969, 187) or to fold the existence of the¶ jangling relation into a less anxiety-producing vocabulary going forward.¶ To identify with the symptom is to begin the process of inventing an identity¶ that allows one to accept and even enjoy the tension as the constitutive¶ feature of the identity (Michael 2000, 12).¶ Nevertheless, the desire to “make a difference” needs to remain in full¶ force. However, when an individual scholar wants to make a difference as¶ the thing in and of itself versus making a distinctly scholarly difference, the¶ antagonism is again repressed. In seeking to make a difference as the thing¶ in itself, scholars, in Žižek’s language, “overtake” their “desire” and become¶ an object of disgust (1991, 110). In fact, Hartnett, McKerrow, Condit, and¶ Giroux are each sensitive to this. Hartnett puts it most explicitly when¶ he warns that the “haggard activist, angry and inflamed, accusing others¶ of their transgressions while embodying anxiety, achieves little, alienates¶ many, and often succumbs to despair” (Hartnett 2010, 70–71; Condit 1990,¶ 345; Giroux 2004, 73). In his eighth and final principle of critical rhetoric¶ (“criticism is performance”), McKerrow qualifies his call to political engagement¶ by distancing himself from Phillip Wander, whom he characterizes¶ as wanting scholars to “take to the streets as practicing revolutionaries.” In¶ other words, after seventeen pages of calling for scholars to perform critical¶ rhetoric in order to liberate the oppressed from institutional and cultural¶ domination, McKerrow devotes three blushing sentences to hedging his¶ bet, explaining that he really just means that scholars should be “specific¶ intellectuals” working within the confines of the university (1989, 108).¶ All of these scholars are correct to fear that the image of activist academics¶ engaging in practices indistinguishable from politics, especially in¶ state-supported institutions, is a potentially grotesque image, even if the¶ popular image is rarely accurate (Ivie 2005, 62–68). Hartnett in particular is¶ not unaware of the significance of public perception. He claims, however,¶ that the public sees decreasing value in universities because they are populated¶ by “inane” and “depraved” scholars (theory wolves) producing publicly¶ disconnected, jargon-riddled nonsense. While this assessment may account¶ for elements within academia that refuse the antagonism by maintaining a¶ relatively thorough detachment from the communities they claim to serve,¶ reducing scholarship to “activists writing about their activism” is no more¶ responsive to the antagonism and would understandably provoke public¶ suspicion (Hartnett 2010, 75, 78).¶ scott welsh¶ 14¶ Moreover, coming to terms with the antagonism is central to academic¶ freedom. In his bracing polemic on politics in the academy, Stanley Fish¶ recognizes the antagonism between academic freedom and the freedom¶ one enjoys as a function of citizenship. Academic freedom, he argues, is¶ the freedom to “academicize” anything freely and without fear of reprisal.¶ For Fish, this means the freedom to treat any subject whatsoever as an¶ open question in need of further study, no matter how politically controversial¶ investigating some particular subject may be (2008, 87). And insofar¶ as every citizen enjoys “freedom of speech,” as Fuller also points out in¶ his reference to Dewey’s founding of the AAUP, academic freedom also¶ includes the right to actually be a citizen advancing a political agenda without¶ fear of losing one’s university employment (2006, 151). However, when¶ the citizenly role of advancing a political agenda overtakes reflective investigation¶ in the practice of the scholarly role, “academic” freedom is not at¶ stake but is, rather, put into jeopardy by the refusal to inhabit the inherently¶ conflicted scholarly subject position that justifies one’s academic immunity¶ from political reprisal in the first place. While “the academic is political” no¶ less than “the personal is political,” that does not mean that it is not useful¶ or necessary to establish a social sphere defined by the intention to resist¶ political embeddedness, even if such a distinction is unavoidably tenuous.

**debate is a competition – using it for a movement causes backlash which crushes coalitions.**

Deborah Tannen, Ph.D., Georgetown University professor of linguistics and University Professor, 1998, “The Argument Culture,” p. 174

**Another scholar who questions the usefulness of opposition as the sole path to truth is philosopher Janice Moulton**. **Philosophy**, she shows, **equates logical reasoning with the Adversary Paradigm, a matter of making claims and then trying to find, and argue against, counterexamples to that claim.** **The result is a debate between adversaries trying to defend their ideas against counterexamples and to come up with counterexamples that refute the opponent's ideas. In this paradigm, the best way to evaluate someone's work is to "subject it to the .. " strongest or most extreme opposition**. **But if you parry individual points-a negative and defensive enterprise-you never step back and actively imagine a world in which a different system of ideas could be true-a positive act**. And you never ask how larger systems of thought relate to each other. According to Moulton, our devotion to the Adversary Paradigm has led us to misinterpret the type of argumentation that Socrates favored: We think of the Socratic method as systematicallyleading an opponent into admitting error. T**his is primarily a way of showing up an adversary as wrong**. Moulton shows that the original Socratic method-the elenchus-was designed to convince others, to shake them out of their habitual mode of thought and lead them to new insight. Our version of the Socratic method-an adversarial publicdebate-is unlikely to result in opponents changing their minds. **Someone who loses a debate usually attributes that loss to poor performance or to an adversary's unfair tactics.**

**B. Impact – coalition building is the only way to effectuate change – this internal link turns the entirety of the aff.**

Krishna, University of Hawaii political science professor, 1993 [Summer, Sankaran, Alternatives, “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory” p. 399-401, accessed 8-8-12, TAP]

In this regard, Der Derian's point that the nature of antiwar protest movements has to change, has to recognize the fact that one can no longer wait for the body bags to come home, is one that merits attention. He notes, in a sharp attack on the left's anti-Gulf War movement: "Like old generals the anti-war movement fought the last war ... a disastrous war of position, constructing ideologically sound bunkers of facts and history while the 'New\* World Order fought a highly successful war of maneuver ... with high speed visuals and a high-tech aesthetics of destruction." (AD: 176-77) While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian's further assertion, that a postmodern critique of the Gulf War mobilization would be somehow more effective, sounds less convincing. An alternative, late-modern tactic against total war was to war on totality itself, to delegitimize all sovereign truths based on class, nationalist, or internationalist metanarratives ... better strategically to play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by cyberwar than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (AD: 177-178; emphasis in original)The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic," essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities" while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activismbased on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choiceoffered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.